In their opinion article, Lewandowsky, Oberauer and Brown [1] make a strong case against time-based accounts of forgetting in short-term and working memory. We argue, however, that the interference-based account they favor is underspecified, that the time-loss functions predicted by time-based models are misconstrued and that the contradictory findings issued from the time-based resource-sharing (TBRS) model [2] are not properly addressed. According to the TBRS model, the cognitive load (CL) involved by a given processing corresponds to the proportion of time during which it occupies attention that is thus unavailable for refreshing memory traces that suffer from time-related decay. In a recent study [5] , we asked participants to remember series of letters, each letter being followed by a fixed period of 6.4 s filled with 4, 6 or 8 digits successively displayed on screen, either in its upper or lower part. Participants had to judge either the spatial location or the parity of these digits by pressing keys, with reaction times (RTs) being registered. In each condition, CL was approximated by dividing the mean sum of the RTs within inter-letter intervals by the duration of these intervals. The CL proved to be a very good predictor of spans, whatever the nature of the task ( Figure I ). The TBRS predicts that a maximal CL of 1 would result in a complete memory loss, whereas when the CL is null, the task becomes a simple span task. Accordingly, the intercept of the CL-loss function fell within Miller's 7 W 2 interval (7.72), whereas the predicted span for CL=1 was close to zero (0.52). Figure I . CL-loss function for the parity and the spatial location span tasks. Adapted, with permission, from Ref. [5] .
In their opinion article, Lewandowsky, Oberauer and Brown [1] make a strong case against time-based accounts of forgetting in short-term and working memory. We argue, however, that the interference-based account they favor is underspecified, that the time-loss functions predicted by time-based models are misconstrued and that the contradictory findings issued from the time-based resource-sharing (TBRS) model [2] are not properly addressed.
First, it is often overlooked that interference-based theories are vague, as Lewandowsky et al. [1] themselves acknowledge when outlining outstanding questions. Some of the same authors have elsewhere argued that forgetting is caused by the overlap of features [3, 4] , but these features are poorly specified. For example, Lewandowsky et al. [1] deny that the disruptive effect of judging the spatial location of squares on the maintenance of letters [5] results
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Box 1.
According to the TBRS model, the cognitive load (CL) involved by a given processing corresponds to the proportion of time during which it occupies attention that is thus unavailable for refreshing memory traces that suffer from time-related decay. In a recent study [5] , we asked participants to remember series of letters, each letter being followed by a fixed period of 6.4 s filled with 4, 6 or 8 digits successively displayed on screen, either in its upper or lower part. Participants had to judge either the spatial location or the parity of these digits by pressing keys, with reaction times (RTs) being registered. In each condition, CL was approximated by dividing the mean sum of the RTs within inter-letter intervals by the duration of these intervals. The CL proved to be a very good predictor of spans, whatever the nature of the task ( Figure I ). The TBRS predicts that a maximal CL of 1 would result in a complete memory loss, whereas when the CL is null, the task becomes a simple span task. Accordingly, the intercept of the CL-loss function fell within Miller's 7 W 2 interval (7.72), whereas the predicted span for CL=1 was close to zero (0.52). from the time-related decay of memory traces when attention is occupied by the spatial task. However, what are the features shared by squares and letters that could explain this phenomenon? Beyond the computational simulation of existing sets of data, is there a metric of this featuresharing interference that would make it possible to predict the amount of interference between two given stimuli? What is the function relating this amount of interference with memory performance? If interference is the sole source of forgetting, can one identify stimuli whose processing does not interfere at all with given memory material? As long as these minimal commitments have not been met, as they are by time-based theories [5] (Box 1), interferencebased accounts seem to rest on arguing from null effects [4] and on post-hoc explanations for time-related effects. Actually, the similarity resulting from feature overlap has little effect in working memory [6] .
Second, calculating a time-loss function as Lewandowsky et al. [1] do by plotting the amount of memory loss on the delay between encoding and recall is questionable. It is beyond doubt that mechanisms of maintenance are used to counteract forgetting in the short term [7, 8] . Thus, a proper assessment of time-related loss must take into account the interplay between the time during which these maintenance activities either can or cannot take place. When this is properly done, another picture appears, revealing the effect of time (Box 1).
Finally, contrary to Lewandowsky et al.'s [1] claim, the TBRS model does not assume that forgetting is only a function of cognitive load, but integrates the effect of peripheral interference [5] . Moreover, ruling out the TBRS model necessitates experiments in which time is carefully controlled, which was not the case in the self-paced tasks used by Oberauer and Lewandowsky [4] . Interestingly, and contrary to interference-based accounts that deny any role of time in short-term memory [4] , the authors concede that 'the time available for memory restoration' has an effect on recall performance: this is perhaps a first step in acknowledging that time has a crucial role in short-term forgetting.
Barrouillet and Camos raise three objections to our conclusion that short-term forgetting is caused by interference rather than decay [1] . They suggest (i) that interference models are 'vague', (ii) that considering forgetting as a function of delay is questionable and (iii) that the timebased resource-sharing (TBRS) model is not challenged by the data we cited. We believe that these objections do not withstand scrutiny.
First, at least one interference model (serial order in a box [SOB] [2, 3] ) is precisely specified and quantitatively predicts 'accuracy and latency of responses', including in Barrouillet and Camos' complex-span task. The TBRS, by contrast, does not seem able to predict data such as serial position curves, grouping effects or effects of phonological similarity.
We agree that interference models should predict the effects of distractor type -as indeed they do; the extent of forgetting differs considerably between different distractors [4] , exactly as predicted by SOB and contrary to a simple decay view. Furthermore, Barrouillet and Camos ask whether stimuli could be sufficiently dissimilar not to cause interference; evidence for nonspecific retroactive interference [5] indicates that the answer is 'no'. Simulations with SOB show that interference does not require similarity; dissimilar distractors disrupt the memory representation at least as much as similar ones. Another interference model [6] predicts that feature overlap (not similarity) causes interference, and the data also confirm this prediction [7] .
Our case against decay does not rest on a null effect but on (i) massive forgetting created by a single interfering event, with (ii) almost no further forgetting caused by several additional identical events [8] . Decay models can-
